Perspectives on (Ca-)Libra #3: Why the Libra is not e-money (on the history of e-money and stablecoins)

Quickly after the announcement of Libra, I, stated that Libra could not be viewed as e-money. Now has come the time to explain my earlier analysis (of June 2019) as to the organisational set up and regulatory qualification of Libra.

Libra is a privately issued and distributed digital  and virtual ‘currency’, that is intended to function as a means of payment. It is not a true currency because its actual composition/counter value is a basket of fiat-currencies and financial instruments. It is not e-money as the Libra is not ‘monetary value’. The digital value qualifies as a financial instrument (a mini-participation in an open ended investment fund) and is used in an open source payment instrument, to be used for payment and acquiring. Both payments and securities legislation apply, as well as the relevant competition and consumer protection rules. 

The Libra association is a manager of the governance and operational arrangements and activities that come with using the virtual currency Libra and participating in the Libra (payment) scheme. This Libra scheme is a private and commercial arrangement which:
- defines a unit of account for a new virtual currency: the Libra,
- defines the asset mix that backs one currency unit,
- lays out the distribution and management rules of the currency units and reserve funds,
- lays out commercial rules and does a private placement to further promote the use of the Libra by giving them away (for free or at a discount). 

Definitions of e-money and term: monetary value
The reason why Libra, as a basket of different currencies, cannot be considered e-money is that it doesn't qualify as such under the definition as it is not monetary value. And to comprehend the definition we must understand that the e-money directive has had a first version and that the European Central Bank was clear on its analysis. E-money is a fiat currency in a digital shape and must be treated as such in terms of: reporting requirements for monetary aggregates, redeemability (at par), assurance that customer fiat money equivalent was kept safe etcetera.

The definition and use of the term 'monetary value' in the first version reflects that all we could think of was digital tokens that one-on-one reflected the physical or existing scriptural account-money forms. This is particularly clear from the consideration 19 in the Opinion of the central bank on the first draft directives.

What we can see here is a central bank ensuring that redeemability against the fiat currency is obliged, in combination with a definition of e-money which does not allow offering e-money at a discount:

"electronic money" shall mean monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is:

(i) stored on an electronic device;

(ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued;

(iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.

Redeemability

1. A bearer of electronic money may, during the period of validity, ask the issuer to redeem it at par value in coins and bank notes or by a transfer to an account free of charges other than those strictly necessary to carry out that operation.

To me, the full analysis and reasoning behind the e-money rules, can only mean that e-money thus covers the 100% forms of convertible fiat currencies. The whole regulatory construct and monetary safeguards in the e-money directive wouldn't work for other constructs. Also, the idea of issuing anything else than a digital equivalent of fiat-currency would have been hypothetical.We are talking the days that each digital player would seek maximum acceptance of the public of any new forms of payments, by piggy-backing on the trust/security mechanisms of the fiat instruments. Introducing a non-fiat-related digital currency was just a step too far and it's not what the E-money directive was meant to support.

When the second e-money directive came in and was aligned with the EU payments directive, it changed some of the structure and definitions. The ECB opinion as to redeemability and monetary matters remained unchanged however, so in essence the rules are still of the same construct. E-money means a one-on-one converted form of existing fiat money and all kinds of monetary statistics, redeemability etc are still in place for the wide variety of mechanisms that now use this regulatory avenue.

We must also understand that at that time we were nowhere near the existence of worldwide consumer platforms with such inherent power to dictate an alternate currency alongside fiat currencies. But now we do have those, including one that tries to issue and launch a Libra. Given the EU e-money directive however, the only reason this Libra would qualify as e-money is when it would be a 100% EU currency backing the Libra. As this is not the case, the Libra will not qualify as e-money.

Should we adapt the EU definition for e-money then?
In theory one could argue that the e-money definition needs adjustment in order to allow the Libra basket of currencies to be regulated. But this doesn't make sense from a financial instruments/securities perspective.

Whenever you dilute a 100% currency basket in the users own currency towards a different asset base, you reform the token at hand into a investment basket. The user is exposed to an additional form of currency and counterparty risk, which does not exist when using the 100% e-money form. Of course the issuer of the financial instrument can proclaim the new asset base to be stable. Or almost stable, but the rules of the financial instrument game are different. If you issue such combinations of assets, you must warn the user of risks, assess whether he/she may be up to the investment/risks that they are taking and so on.

Not obliging Libra to have to do so would be creating an uneven playing field towards all kinds of other providers of financial instruments that equally seek to provide their financial services to customers via a similar asset package that can be bought in tiny portions. In addition, the monetary concerns involved in overissuance of the e-money product may go beyond the geography of the central banks involved as monetary authorities in the currency basket. Merely allowing a basket of currencies as backing for an e-money product would not be consistent with the ECB analysis on relevant monetary considerations and rules to ensure financial stability.

So, as stable as you may give your product a name or try to sell it to the public or regulators, all regulatory and market experts know that no currency basket will ever be stable. Effectively, suggesting the fact that it would be stable for the end-user would be mis-selling of the product, misleading the consumer and what have you. So name it stablecoin as you like, but it remains a risky participation in an investment fund/currency basket. And all rules under EU securities to such investments do apply. Meaning disclosure rules, but also rules as to who can trade/distribute this instrument. It will not at all be open to trade for everyone, without restrictions.

Does paying with Libra involve a payment instrument then?
Next up is the question what exactly qualifies as a payment instrument in the Libra setup. In my view the financial participation is a digital asset/financial instrument. And of course, if you wish, such an instrument could be used to pay. Rather than sending someone digital fiat currencies, the provision of the tradeable digital financial instrument would consist the payment. The payment with Libra would thereby be a payment in kind, as if I exchange a bread for a bottle of water.

So is there a payment instrument involved and where is it?

Next up is the question if we can see a payment instrument, a payment order and a payment transaction under the Payment Services Directive, leading to the placing, transferring or withdrawing of funds. I think the main idea in this respect is to take the intentions of Libra to serve as a worldwide payment system as a starting point. This means we will have to take a close look at the question if tools are provided to the user (yes) meaning those tools (wallets) may qualify as payment instruments, if they move funds, which are defined as:

banknotes and coins, scriptural money or electronic money as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of Directive 2009/110/EC;

If the Libra is not banknotes and coins nor eletronic money, we only have the wonder if it could qualify as scriptural money. But this is indeed where it becomes a bit complicated. As the ECB put it, when advising on the Payment Services Directive:

12.10 The term ‘scriptural money’ is used in the proposed directive without being defined, e.g. in Article 3(b), Article 4(8) of the proposed directive and paragraph 7 of the Annex to the proposed directive. It is suggested that a definition of scriptural money should be established (in the definitions article), bearing in mind that only central banks and credit institutions (which include e-money institutions) may hold such funds.

So we have two options. We could consider the Libra issued by Libra association to the Libra association members (who are all registered security companies, allowed to offer, trade and sell financial products to the public and each other) a form of scriptural money. This is not illogical, given the explicit intentions of the Libra association and it would require the regulatory flexibility to allow for a self issued unit of account / securities product to be viewed as a form of money.

The other option is of course to not view the Libra as scriptural money and not apply the Payment Services Directive to a payment instrument which has a worldwide scope and impact. Although this may sound illogical, it is not illogical at all. The apps and tools that are used to pass on the Libra to other consumers would still have to comply with all securities related regulations. Users would have to sign up, pass suitability tests, issuers, brokers and exchanges of the Libra would need to have their MIFID licenses and such, so the customer would still be protected.

The exercise does show however that the Libra association has had little consideration to the relevant EU requirements and definitions when choosing Switzerland as their jurisdiction. Their guess may have been that they might be able to convince the local regulator to bend the rules a little, but the choice of a currency basket (and financial instrument structure) effectively deters its worldwide inclusive use for cross-border payments. Alternatively, a choice for a single currency basket might work, which would make it regular e-money, to which the PSD and all kinds of KYC/AML rules apply. Yet, this would mean that there needs to be a single issuer in the business model, as the reselling of e-money is prohibited under the EU regulations.

It is this considerable ignorance of relevant EU rules that has made it clear to me that Libra and Facebook will at no point in time be able to make their business model work. A brief visit to any innovation hub at any central bank would have made the above inconsistencies clear, but they apparently chose to ignore this. And the reason may be that the Swiss policy papers on stablecoins may have provided them with the impression that there was some leeway here. But even the relevant local supervisor has explained to them that both securities and payments legislation applies and that their business model will not work.

Then again, this is Facebook, pushing and moving so why could they have been so wrong in their assessment?

My hunch is that Facebook have applied a US centric approach to the whole regulatory debate on issuance of stablecoins and forgot how the regulatory regimes between EU and US differ. But for that I refer to the PS.

The main conclusion for now is: Libra does not qualify as e-money and the transfer of Libra might constitute a payment transfer, depending on the view one has with respect to the application of the word scriptural money under todays context.

February 5, 2020


PS. Regulatory regimes for stablecoins (US) and e-money (EU)
To put this in perspective for US readers, I want to shed a regulatory light onto the difference between stablecoins and e-money and the relevance of 1990s legislative landscapes in the US en Europe with respect to payments. The background against which the e-money directive was being developed here in Europe, was one in which - just as now - all over the world, people were thinking about the best forms of regulation of a new phenomenom: e-cash: electronic cash or Internet cash.

At that point in time I worked for the Dutch central bank and I investigated the difference between the existing regulatory regimes in Europe and in the US payments (see the American Law Review article here). And the big thing to take away here is that:
- the US had both banking supervision laws and money transmission laws,
- Europe did not have money transmission laws and only bank supervision regulation (somewhat harmonized under EU rules).

The consequence of this difference is that the US regulators had a clear money transmission framework that they could use, to apply to new forms of Internet payments and digital coins. In essence they all proclaimed new internet payment stuff to be some fort of money transmission, either by their design or by their nature. And thus: the regulation of those new forms of payment was easily done. No change in laws was required.

In Europe, there was no uniform payment legislation on a European scale. Different member states had different local rules on payments. We had to have a euro in place and many years of deliberation before we even ended up with a harmonised Payment Services Directive in 2007. So we had no payments legislation but we did have some form of e-cash begging to be regulated somehow. As the ECB had clearly outlined its concerns in this respect.

So the fierce debate in Europe was: should e-money be considered the functional equivalent of banking?

The main reasoning was: upon issuance of an e-money token of 1 euro, the issuer receives one euro of the public. This means attracting deposits from the public, which is part of the banking definition. Whereas central banks and Ministries of Finance felt this way, the Ministries of Economic Affairs succeeded in convincing them that an intermediate, light-weight banking regime should be set up. So we got an E-money Directive, creating EU license regimes for organisations that issue electronic money to the public, upon receipt of regular fiat money, which electronic money is then used for all sorts of payments.

The digital e-money had to be issued and redeemed at a 1 on 1 level (at par) and the e-money organisation had to safeguard the full reserve in a separate financial vehicle (or insurance arrangement). No license would be given if the safeguards weren't in place, so this means that the European e-money regime boils down to a regulatory regime which safeguards e-money. Or, what most US people would view as stablecoins (digital tokens, to be issued, traded, sold and transacted on the basis of an at-par rule with the original fiat currency).

Now back to the US. Initially the US payments regulation thus seemed well suited to adapt to new technologies. The birth of the bitcoin and other currencies created an issue. In essence, the US regulators didn't care to define a separate token or form of e-money into their payments regulation. They just stated that virtual currencies were a form of currencies and hence the money transmission regulations should be in place somehow.

Therefore Tether and TrueUSD are registered with the Fincen, but without the legal European safeguards in place to guarantuee the peg. Then again the New York bitlicense regime does have those safeguards, but it is clear that no US regime for stablecoins exists. We can see that the US now lags in regulatory terms. It has fragmented state laws on payments, where EU caught up with harmonised payments legislation and harmonised e-money legislation. And the European e-money regime is essentially the unified EU stablecoin regime for tokens that seek a 1-1 peg with a fiat currency.

EC gives open banking to bigtech via PSD-2 and Apple closes its doors to banks in return ?

Just the other day I attended a session of the Dutch Foreign Bankers Association, all about Fintech disruption and innovation. Guest speaker Jesse McWaters, who is the project lead for the Fintech programme of the World Economic Forum, shared his insights into the tech-revolution and how this impacts the business models in financial industry.

Banks, big tech and big data: the uneven battlefield- thanks to PSD2 
One very important observation that he made had to do with the place of banks in the future value chain. They can choose whether to be a product provider or whether to engage in battling for the end-consumer experience by providing multi-party platforms. In this latter approach, it is a big data game. Both banks and big tech will be battling in the same arena where banks need bigtech data and bigtechs need bank data to complete their 360 views of their customers.

In this respect Mc Waters had an interesting question to us, Europeans. He asked if anyone at the European Commission would have understood the huge impact that PSD2 and obliged open banking will have on the competition balance between banks and big techs in the market. Doesn't this skew the balance in favour of the bigtechs without anything in return for the banks?

My response was that in essence the whole open-banking idea in the PSD2 originated from an EC-monoline bureaucratic approach to solving a competition case between one fintech and the European Payments Council (see newsbulletin).

I also sketched that the implicit rule of the PSD2 appears to be that such access without prior commercial contract would be free, even though an analysis from our Dutch competition authority outlines why there is a good case for putting in place a compensation for banks for the access to the customer data. And no, the access is not reciprocal. Big data companies would not have to open up their accounts full of customer information for banks.

Bunq opening up Apple Pay for Dutch customers but then being foreclosed by Apple 

The interesting thing is that we were having the above exchange of thoughts in a week where Bunq had announced to move its systems fully into the could of Amazon (bigtech). And Bunq had also opened up Applepay for its customers. By tweaking the geography settings, Dutch users could start using their phone for Apple-pay.

The fun for bunq-ers didn't last too long though. Apple used its powerful bigtech position to shut out the Dutch bunqers from using Applepay. And my guess is, that its arguments for doing so would be pretty much the same arguments that Sofort heard when they connected to German banks. It would not be safe, there would be no required commercial contract allowing this access and so on.

Time for reciprocity?
It seems that already some time ago the EC course on Bigtech has been changing. We are beginning to realize that we may need to protect our citizen's data somewhat better and that we should not help them avoid taxation. Hence the announcement this week of a 3% tax for bigtech, to make sure they do not get a free ride here in Europe.

It would be very much in line with this new vision towards bigtech if the European Commission mandates open acces to customers big-tech information for banks or any other licensed entity that have the customers permission to request it.

If the Commission truly seeks to achieve a balanced market with proper competition, it should redress the design errors in the PSD-2 and allow banks to ask fees for access and/or allow them reciprocal access to the customer data.

A new FAQ for PSD2 would be very useful to harmonise interpretations across Europe

Summary

The second Payment Services Directive, published end of December last year, is an important and welcome next in the further integration of payment services in Europe. In order to achieve a true European level playing field ‘on the ground’, a clarifying FAQ for those who prepare its implementation today would be very welcome.

A FAQ that explains how the PSD2 definitions will apply in all Member states to the variety of business models and transaction mechanisms observed, will enhance the purported level playing field. This harmonised guidance is just as important as the FAQ/guidance provided for the first PSD. Both regulators and the market have further developed since PSD1 and it is essential to recognise some of the underlying dynamics and developments of the payments market.  

1. Out of scope, limited network or regulated?

At present, member states use the harmonised PSD-rules to determine whether or not a certain business model defines as a payment activity or can be categorised as an exemption. Both in terms of content and process, the approaches vary considerably between supervisors. The feedback of supervisors varies from an elaborate argumentation to merely the brief outcome of an internal review process. 

Also in terms of content, the approaches vary. Business models that are out of scope in one member state may be exempt or require a license in others. The lack of a central register of supervisory statements on those matters makes this hard to identify, but the PSD2 will change this. All business activity exempted under article 3k and 3l, must be notified and the exemption decision will be published in a central register.

The practical consequence is that market participants can more easily determine which business models are exempted in which countries. This means that the supervisors must ensure that their qualifications are well-grounded and harmonised. One of the major challenges in this respect is to take into account the technological and market developments.

2. Technological developments: open and device-agnostic

Just one look at a user’s technical environment demonstrates that the major trend in payment technology development is the move from closed, bespoke systems and standards to more open structures. Whereas previously payment providers would control (sometimes own) all technological instruments to be used in a payment transaction, this is no longer the case.

The future infrastructure setting is one in which consumers and merchants will use their own technical device, and providers need to ensure that it can be used safely. We can now see card-based payments, where no plastic is used anymore, as the payment is made via a virtual card application in the mobile phone or PC. At the same time, in the back-office, the systems are opening up to the outside world via Application Programming Interface’s (APIs). Rather than having one instrument that operates as a shopping and a payments tool simultaneously, we can see that the value chain of search, shop and pay can be arranged via modularized interfacing of channels and technologies.

Therefore, when assessing the qualification of the technologies in todays payments, an open and functional approach is required. The classical approach, in which one tries to find the main device (such as a card) that services as the payment instrument and then builds the further classification of a system around that instrument, will no longer work. There will be all kinds of devices and technical tools and while some may classify as payment instruments, others may not.

Fortunately, the definition of payment instrument in the payment services directive enables this functional approach. The definition mentions both ‘a personalized device’ and/or a ‘set of procedures’ to be viewed and defined as the payment instrument:

"payment instrument" means a personalised device(s) and/or set of procedures agreed

between the payment service user and the payment service provider and used in order

to initiate a payment order;

3. Where is the commerce and where is the payment transaction?

As technology slices up the commercial value chain, we should note the relevance of the last element of the definition of payment instrument: ‘to initiate a payment order’. There is a clear difference between the commercial use of devices for purchases (apps, shopping carts on the web, nfc-identification devices) and the later moment in which aggregated purchases are actually being paid. This can be compared to the difference between the shopping cart/button on a website and the payment button.

The main question to ponder is therefore: does the technology service allow the user to make a payment to any other payee in Europe (under the SEPA-rules) and is the transaction actually a payment order, or is it merely a shopping transaction, with payments being arranged later on.

I wouldn’t be surprised if in the next years, we will witness a shift away from devices as the actual payment instrument. It may be more suitable to put the (user) accounts centre stage as the actual payment instrument. When applied by retailer organisations, such a choice will enable them to build a multi-channel sales-channel in which the device used is irrelevant. The sales channel aggregates purchase transactions towards the user account at the retailer. In cases where the retailer merely aggregates these purchases and initiates a direct debit for the total sum to be paid, this remains an administrative account as the actual payment account in the process is that of the bank. Only in cases where actual payments orders are initiated from such an account, it would become the payment account as well as the payment instrument for the commercial transactions.

It is crucial to distinguish the commercial from the payment process domain when evaluating apps and identification tools on the market. The actual payments can be expected to become the afterthought of commerce, rather than a primary service. These can flow via a payment account in the background, which is provided by retailer, bank or payment service provider. It is that account that will then function as the payment instrument in the commercial transaction and not the purchase device/application used. Supervisors should thus not immediately label ‘the card’ or any specific technical tool in a commercial business model as the payment instrument.

4. Areas and definitions of interest for the application of the PSD2

We’ve seen that the democratisation of technology allowed non-bank payment service providers to enter the payment space. Among those will also be retailers that can leverage the technology to provide a better customer experience. If those retailers are to use a services and customer contract with a monthly SEPA-direct debit agreement in the background, the payment services directive will not be relevant for them.

Similarly there is the question whether the payments services directive would have to apply to intermediary web-based platform companies that help users transact among themselves. Such business models could be in or out of scope based on the interpretation whether:

- the payments are seen as a regular occupation or business activity (art 1,2b),

- the agency model applies,

- the new definition of acquiring applies,

- the limited network exemption applies.

I hope that the collective of regulatory players involved in the transposition and application of the PSD2 will succeed in addressing those scoping and definitions issues early-on. In this respect the publication of a FAQ on those issues, may be a very effective tool to clarify and ensure the level playing field.

Now that the voting on the PSD is done, the real work starts...

The second Payments Services Directive, also known as PSD2, will be officially established today. In the plenary session discussion yesterday all political groups backed the achieved consensus and highlighted the benefits to consumers, the increased security of payments, further innovation in the payments area and lower cost overall.

Some work ahead...
We should realize however, that with the promulgation the real work will start for a whole range of involved players. First and foremost, there is a lot more work ahead for regulators and supervisors in the transposition process, but in particular also for the European Banking Authority. The PSD2 that seeks to open up access to banks and customer bank accounts for new players, leaves quite a bit of work to be done by EBA.

EBA should:
- develop rules on level of guarantee/professional indemnity insurance for payment initiation service providers and account information service providers,
- set up standards for cooperation and data exchange between local supervisor and resolve disputes on different applications of the PSD2,
- set up a central register of payment institutions and agents licensed under the directive,
- develop regulatory standards that define when the appointment of a central local contact point can be demanded by local supervisors and what its functions should be,
- be informed immediately in the case of emergency situations (such as large scale fraud),
- coordinate requirements as to the security frameworks applied,
- specify the requirements of common and open standards of communication to be implemented by all account servicing payment service providers that allow for the provision of online payment services,
- develop guidelines on a harmonised set of information to be provided during the application for a payment institution license,
- publish local exemptions under article 3k and 3l in the public register,

Clarity for industry on EU-application of definitions and scope
When the first PSD was delivered, it turned out that quite some players in the market required timely insights as to the future scope of the directive and how it would impact them. The European Commission then published an FAQ that further outlined how definitions should be understood.

It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to perform a similar exercise right now as there are quite some areas that can give rise to questions. As an example: the recital on the agency exemption leaves open the existence of agents for both buyer and supplier as long as the agent does not enter into posession of the funds. Yet, the definition of acquiring appears to be purposefully wide, meaning that such commercial agents might after all be viewed as acquirers.

The sooner this clarity is provided, the better it is, as the lead time for setting up and getting a license as a payment institution is similar to the lead time that now exists for transposing the PSD2.

I therefore hope that, for the sake of a proper EU level playing field, the collective of regulatory players involved in the transposition and application of the PSD2, will seek to address those scoping and definitions issues early-on.

The Euro Retail Payments Board: first meeting and outlook

On Friday, the 16^th of May, the Euro Retail Payments Board (ERPB) held its first meeting (with this agenda) in Frankfurt. The ERPB is the successor to the SEPA Council, which aimed at realising the SEPA-project. Whereas the SEPA Council was co-chaired by the ECB and the European Commission, the chair of the ERPB is Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB.

First Meeting

The first meeting was dedicated to agree to the mandate, functioning and work plan of the ERPB. The ERPB Members decided to set up a working groups on post-migration issues relating to the SEPA credit transfer and SEPA direct debit schemes as well as one working group on pan-European electronicmandate solutions for SEPA direct debits. In addition the ERPB acknowledged and asked the Cards Stakeholder Group (CSG) to carry out a stock-taking exercise and devise a work plan with respect to card standardization.

The ERPB further discussed the expansion of the SEPA Direct Debit scheme (SDD) with a non-refundable (one-off) direct debit. It was agreed that the EU legislators would be asked to clarify legal refund-conditions when evaluating the Payment Services Directive and that a possible scheme would be launched only after this review was complete.

In order to further investigate the future use of pan-European electronic mandatesfor SDD, the ERPB set up a separate working group. Finally, the EPC presented the latest update on the migration to SEPA. Whereas the migration to credit-transfers was very close to completion, there remained work done for direct debits. The ERPB called upon all stakeholders in the euro area to complete their migration to SEPA payment instruments as early as possible and before the deadline. 

Outlook for the ERPB

The launch of the European Retail Payments Board marks a new starting point for discussing the future of European payments with all stakeholders involved. The inclusion of payment institutions and e-money industry can add considerable value given their different approach and background. These providers live and breathe Internet-based technology, seek EU-standardisation and do not have similar legacy-systems as the banks. I expect this to lead to fruitful debates and exchange of insights.

Some observers may cite the lack of legislative powers as a disadvantage of the ERPB. Others may wonder if it is possible to achieve results in a body that only meets twice a year. I would submit however that in ten year’s time, the sceptics will look back in surprise to see how the ERPB has positively shaped the outcome of the European debate on retail payments. The Dutch experience with similar standing committees (see this separate blog) demonstrates that there is a lot of unlocked potential that lies in the trust and bonds that will be formed and shaped by this collective effort. 

FCA kicks the Securepay-can down the road...

In March 2014, the FCA, the prudential supervisor for UK based payment institutions and e-money providers, outlined that it would not be strictly assessing the compliance with the Securepay Recommendations on the security of Internet Payments. This announcement was quite interesting as in February 2014, the Forum also published an assessment guide that assists payment service providers with the implementation of these Recommendations by February 2015.

FCA Statement:
We have decided to await the publication of guidance from the European Banking Authority on measures for the security of internet payments and will begin to assess firms’ implementation of these security measures when the updated Payment Services Directive requirements take effect.

The updated Payment Service Directive will enter into effect at the earliest by mid 2016. It will assign the European Banking Authority with the task of further developing guidance for the security of retail payments. The FCA has chosen to wait for this guidance rather than pre-empt it.

Kicking the security-can down the road
It is interesting to note that the FCA seeks a pragmatic middle ground. It carefully states that it finds security an important issue while at the same time outlining that it will wait for a solid legal basis to assess the security of retail payments. In doing so it effectively kicks the tricky security can down the road.

I can well understand the FCA desire to kick this can. The Securepay recommendations on security lead to quite some questions in their practical application for different technologies (see the blog here). On top of that, the detailed prescriptions on the basis of the new Payment Services Directive may lead to further rules that limit the choices that market entities can make to achieve a certain level of security.

Rather than confuse the market with layering requirements which quickly follow each other, the FCA apparently chose to wait and see, hoping that the final rules on security for retail payments may become more balanced.

It will be interesting to see if other supervisors follow suit.

Is a 'democratic' crowd based cryptocurrency just as fair as the traditional ones?

Having gone through my daily portion of Bitcoin-reads (and being somewhat sceptic), it struck me that one of the compelling arguments of collective currencies: 'money to the people' is highly flawed. It is the strong resentment against governments and financial institutions that makes many people believe that it would be good to take the power of money-creation out of governments' hands. But what would happen if we would indeed forget for a moment about the governments?

Crowd based currencies: exclusive and leading to private gains
As nice as it appears, these new currencies will then not be as evenly spread as the current ones in existence. There is quite bit of knowledge and expertise involved in obtaining, developing and working with new crowd-based currencies. So the 'democratic' nature of these currencies is not as democratic as we may think. The amount of people that may vote and can use cash is considerably wider than the amount of people able to use or make virtual currencies. 

We should realise ourselves that in essence, any currency, whether it is a government-owned or private in nature, leads to a certain distribution of value and wealth for the issuer and among the user base. And the question that is not being asked, at present, is whether the new crowd-based currencies will distort the distribution of value and wealth in society? Nor do we ask ourselves the question if we would prefer to be subject to the consequences of behaviour of (collective) private entities, manipulating a currency while we can't influence them, instead of a government structure (however flawed it may appear).

The redistribution of value that can occurs with these new currencies may look democratic, but that is a wolfe in sheep' s clothes. Effectively the new currencies are and will be the domain of private individuals trying to seek private gain rather than anything else. And there is no guarantee whatsoever that this constellation will have the interests at heart of all people in society. It will be Darwins' survival of the fittest all over again, which will exclude certain groups of citizens from participating fully in society. As democratic as a crowdbased currency looks: you will still be a puppet but on a different string, with unknown gains being made by unknown players in the value chain of this collective currency.

Currencies should be as fair as possible
Thus, the claim that crowd-based exchange mechanisms or digital currencies are more democratic than the existing ones must be strongly rejected. They are not and they lead to a very uneven an undemocratic redistribution of value in society. The central question in this debate should be which institutional design prevents the most harm from being done. 

Despite all the existing flaws that may be present in our governments or current monetary situation, the truly democratic currencies and those that may do the least harm are those operated by the governments that we can vote in or out.

The proposed EU-directive on Bank Accounts: wrong tool

Today, the European Commission will announce a proposal for a Directive on Bank Accounts that covers the following areas:

- comparability of bank account fees: the aim is to make it easier for consumers to compare the fees charged for bank accounts by banks and other payment service providers in the EU;

- bank account switching: the purpose is to establish a simple and quick procedure for consumers who wish to change from their current bank account to a different one, with the same or a different bank or other financial institution;

- universal access to bank accounts: the aim is to allow all EU consumers, irrespective of their country of residence or financial situation, to open a payment account, which allows them to perform essential operations.

 

With the proposal the Commission continues its standard policy towards the financial sector: ride the road of regulation as long as the sector is still unpopular with the public. It has done so with regulation 2560 (on fees) which had to motivate banks to speed up intercountry payment processing in Europe and it has in a similar vein used the regulatory process for the Payment Services Directive. Repeatedly we see the banking sector respond with initiatives to improve operations and just as repeatedly we see the European Commission and Parliament find that this was not sufficient and move forward with regulation.

 

At face value, the goals of the Commission with this Directive seem laudable. But what would interest me most is the degree with which the Commission has done its regulatory homework. Quite some time ago, there were EU-initiaves and rules on 'better regulation', which meant that a solid cost-benefit analysis would be required by the Commission before proceeding with further regulation. In the process of discussing switching cost, the Commission did not follow these rules however (see blog).

I remember that at the time I was amazed by the ease with which the Commission bypassed the work done by an EU expert group on user mobility in bank accounts (of which I was a member). The consequence was that, without having proper data as to the degree of problems experienced, the nature of the problems in different countries, the discussion remained a yes/no discussion. So I was quite interested to see if in the mean time there is more hard evidence on the table to determine the nature of the problem that needs to be solved (and to see if it is a European or a national problem).

A quick look at the impact assessment tells me that not much has changed. It is essentially a fast forward reasoning towards the norm that unless everyone in Europe switches bank accounts quite a lot, the market is evidently failing and thus regulation is necessary. Furthermore there is a blind eye as to the different types of service providers: the document assumes all players to be banks with a full service package. In terms of analysis, it is skewed as it misses one alternative explanation for low bank switching rates. That explanation could be that, from a consumer budget point of view, it is more economical and rational to use the scarce time to chip off a small percentage of other purchases (mortgage or lending percentages, tablet-purchases or mobile phone subscriptions) than to spend a lot of time comparing and switching banks and earning very little revenue in the process (see also the presentation here that discusses which assumptions lead to which regulatory preference).

Seeing the current state of discussions (a directive proposal) it seems hard to imagine that the plan would be withdrawn or modified seriously. Still, it would be useful if the Commission had done their homework a bit better and at least had chosen a proper regulatory tool. If indeed the provision of bank accounts accross the EU is a concern, why not choose Universal Services Obligation as the regulatory mechanisms, that is most suited?

We used this mechanism before in Europe, to designate the amount of public telephone's that had to be available to the public. And setting it up for banking isn't hard to do (read this Tilburg University Report) but it does require one thing: a better cost/benefit analysis:
Furthermore, designating all banks to take care of the product dimension of a Universal Services Obligation (e.g., consisting of only a basic bank account service) may be the most effective way of implementing it, provided that the USO has a minimal scope. However, with regard to the geographical dimension of a USO, designating all banks leads to unnecessary cost duplication, so that it is worthwhile to consider other options, such as self-regulation and a franchising mechanism in combination with an auction. In addition, technological developments in a sector are very relevant when assessing the need or desirability of universal service obligations. By interfering in these processes without having made it clear in advance that there is a problem, such developments may be distorted; hence the importance of carrying out a cost-benefit analysis as a starting point.

I think the citizens of Europe are best off with goverments that only regulate when the facts are evident and the tools of regulation are properly geared to the problem at hand. At this point in time, with this Bank Account Directive, I believe we are heading for another emotion-based, cost-increasing all-in Eu-wide regulation, which underlying problems (if any) could have been solved much cheaper and easier by using other more appropriate regulatory tools.


PS. The post is updated at 1823 to include some of the impact assessment data.
 

The ECB-report on virtual currency schemes: some reflections

The last month, the ECB published a report on virtual currency schemes. I have been reading this with great interest as it signals the involvement of the central banks in a new area: virtual currrencies. The relevance of this report must therefore not be misunderstood. We should remember that in 1994, the EMI-report on pre-paid cards signalled the start of the regulation of prepaid-cards and electronic money products. And in a similar style, this report may become the starting point for regulation of virtual currencies.

In general, central banks are to be commended for monitoring the developments in the area of money, retail payments and near-money products. If you're a central bank, an institution that is responsible for true money, than it it always good to know what other forms of money are in circulation. And as such the report of the ECB demonstrates that the European central banks are alert.

Analytical basis could improve
I must say however that I was also somewhat disappointed. The analytical framework presented in the report is a bit shaky in my view.  It does not rest on the nature of the subject discussed (virtual tokens and currencies), but on how they are 'regulated'. As an approach, I find this little convincing. Furthermore I noted that 'unregulated' is not defined. Does it mean that central banks or supervisors are not involved or that no regulation applies at all?

As an alternative I would point out the possibility of using frameworks suchs as this one (taken from the American Law Review):

It is interesting to note that the empty box in this table can now be filled with: Bitcoin as an example of a system where money can circulate freely without returning to a central mint.

Which electronic tokens are currency of money and which are not?
The ECB distinghuishes between three virtual currency types, in terms of openness of the systems involved.

Type 1 is a closed link system in which the digital tokens are only usable in the system itself. The example the ECB provides is the World of Warcraft Gold. And although the picture suggests that there is no link to the real economy, the ECB notes: However, there seems to be a black market for buying and selling WoW Gold outside the virtual currency scheme. If Blizzard Entertainment discovers any illegal exchange, it can suspend or ban a player’s account. 

Type 2 contains systems where users pre-pay services of a supplier in the form of private issuer tokens such as facebook credits. And type 3 systems are open systems of privately issued tokens/currency that can be bought and sold. It is in this category that bitcoin and Linden dollars are placed.

What is lacking in this model, is the Type of model 1b where there is no formal buying or selling of tokens, but there is a relation to the physical world. It is the world of loyalty points and tokens, which can be earned and redeemed, but never exchanged for money itself. The ECB places these under the category II.

It appears to me that in doing so, the ECB doesn't distinguish sufficiently between loyalty tokens and payment tokens,which each have a different role to play in the business model of their issuer. An alternative table might have been:

	User cannot buy tokens at all (loyalty-type)	User earns tokens and can buy additional (hybrid of loyalty/payment)	User buys and sells  tokens (payment-type)
Tokens used in digital issuer-domain only		World of Warcraft	World of Warcraft Lynden Dollar
Tokens used in digital or physical issuer-domain only	Starbucks	Nintendo Points -Digital Payment loyalty schemes for single retailers
Tokens used at other entities than the issuer	Frequent Flyer Programmes	Frequent Flyer Programmes	Bitcoin, e-money on mobile phone's

The missing element: mobile money
What intrigues me is that the digital money on mobile phones is not a part of the discussion. It is by its definition (an exemption in the e-money directive) an unregulated form of digital money. Yet, the ECB has been so long accustomed to the strange sequence of events that made the European Commission decide that money on antenna's of MNO"s is not electronic money, that they forgot to include it in the analysis.

The reputation argument.....
Finally I noticed that the ECB finds, that if these virtual currency schemes (however defined) grow too much, they might give rise to a reputation issue for the central banks. Here again I think the analysis is a bit too strongly worded. Central banks can simply outline their scope of work and responsibility by stating that they  are not in any way responsible for money that they didn't issue and supervise. By clearly and repeatedly informing the public of this fact, the public can then choose to take a risk with the virtual currencies or stay out of them.

Yet, I wouldn't be surprised if this reputation argument (or a comparable public policy objective: transparancy) becomes the main angle from which future supervision of these schemes will be justified.

Six Pack becomes fivepack: T-mobile leaves NFC-consortium of Dutch banks and telcos

Tweakers net today reports that T-mobile is leaving the consortium of banks and telco's in the Netherlands. The sixpack consortium is also delayed in its plans (from mid 2012 to beginning of 2013) given the considerable market share that both the banks and telco's have. So they will go to Brussels to aks for exemption of competition rules.

Interesting paper on best practices for Payment Regulation

As I browsed through the programme and speakers of the E-MA conference on e-money I noticed that Rhys Bollen would present on regulatory issues. And upon googling I discovered his dissertation on best practices for Payment Regulation. Although I haven't finished reading it yet, I think it's quite a good read that deserves further attention.

Latest oversight framework of the ECB: the institutional drift continues and the blind spot for outside-payments increases

Today, the ECB published updated standards for oversight of payment and settlement systems. And once more I found it quite interesting to observe this big institution increase its span of control and policy-reach in a process which is called institutional drift. Which is a scientific term for: just grab something that is within reach of what you're doing and see if anyone can stop you. If not, you just expanded succesfully your territory. Which is the fuel and drive for any organisation or institution of course.

The distinctive example of institutional drift, worthy of further scientific exploration (if ever a political scientist would wish to do so), regards the vague term: 'oversight' on payment systems. And in this blog I am giving some clues as to a possible lines of reasoning and research.

1. In general it is of course a good thing that central banks, in their role as an important local government institution keep an eye on the developments in the payments and securities sector in their country. Some central banks at some point in time called this: 'oversight'.

2. And should anyone wonder if this is the same as supervision: it is not. Supervision is formally described and delegated in general laws and supervision law. Oversight on the other hand is a self-invented word of central banks. Yet there are always some generic words in the central bank law that vaguely refer to the job of central banks to promote smooth payment systems.

3. This promotion of smooth payment is of course relevant given the role of a central bank as the settlement bank for active banks in its country. But in time, central banks have started using the terminology and words in bank law to increase their action radius. So they started becoming involved with national retail payments, not being a real supervisor, but sort of acting as such and using complicated terminology as oversight to disguise (in some countries) the lack of a strong legal basis. So we have a mixed bag of central banks in the EU, all claiming to also do oversight, with some of them having a real legal basis, and others not having it really.

4. Enter the European central bank, more than ten years ago. In a quest for a bigger role in the universe, they found the oversight function to be of relevance and started drawing in this territory. Which brought them in conflict with some local central banks that said: 'Hey, ECB, hands off our local retail payment systems and oversight, that is a local matter, not a European matter'. But then again, over time such a stance can't be uphold, due to the centralizing powers of any power centre. So the ECB's role in retail payments oversight got bigger and bigger.

5. So over time we could witness the Dutch local central bank publish and use 'oversight'-standards. The ECB got involved in cards-standards. Which was a strange move, upon which the Dutch Bankers Association also commented:
1 The Articles 105(2) of the Treaty and Articles 3 and 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB) at best provide a legal basis to publish or enact regulations with respect to gross-settlement systems that are directly relevant for the functioning of the money market. We note that the scope of the proposed oversight framework for CPS extends beyond this domain. While we recognize that analytically the proposed framework (or any other payments oversight regulation and measures of the ESCB) may perhaps be considered ‘in line’ with the statutory tasks of the ESCB, we are of the opinion that such an extension lacks the required legal basis. Additionally we note that it is only remotely related to the primary tasks of maintaining price stability.

6. Still, this verbal slap on the hand by the NVB made no impression whatsoever, and so we can witness the European central bank pursuing the quest for retail payment oversight. There is a catch however. The ECB conforms to the definition of payment instruments in the Payment Systems Directive and thus leaves a whole range of thirdparty instruments as OV-chipcards or e-money on mobile phones out of their scope. So here is an interesting blind spot.

7. If we take the spirit of the ECB document as a guidance, aren't mobile phone money and pre-paid cards (and possibly all other new kinds of payment mechanisms) effectively the instruments that most require some form of oversight? And aren't those the systems (rather than the ones of banks) that have the best record in making the money of consumers effectively disappear? Contactless card may be more prone top operational errors (the Dutch system is) and money on mobile phone is notoriously gone due to unrequested reverse billing via sms and what have you.

8. So what I find intriguing is the mixed message the ECB is thus sending. On the one hand they wish to increase their hand/policy area to fit all the world of payments into their remit. So with an not-legally based word as oversight they conquer the retail payments world. Yet, they carefully seek to steer clear from instruments that may be too complicated or are too tough to handle.

9. Which leads me to my final questions. Who asked for this? Who is paying this? And is anyone in Europe holding the ECB responsible for what they are doing in the area of retail payment oversight? Are they being evaluated by some other organisation than just themselves? And is this what the European citizens or European Parliament wish the ECB to do (rather than leave this to local central banks)?

Single market review forgets better regulation principles

This recent single market review is interesting in many ways. We can see that the Commission is selling Europe to the citizen. And bashing banks is always popular, so we can see that happening now as well. Without awaiting the results of a consultation on a report (that finds no evidence base on the exisence of a switching problem) the Commission wishes switching services to improve. In doing so it jumps to conclusions and forgets it's own better regulation principles.

This is not the best way forward. Let's relook the earlier committments of Commissioner Mccreevy on this matter:
Ladies and Gentleman, this Commission is taking a more variable, more modern approach to regulation. Strict adherence to better regulation principles. Wide consultation. Full impact assessments to ensure that initiatives are fully thought through. Legislation only where clear benefits are apparent.
And let's now proceed to see the real-life case of user mobility in the retail financial services area.

1. In the white paper on financial services, the Commission set up an expert group to discuss user mobility.
2. After one years work, the group concluded that there was no evidence base and no agreement between different stakeholders on the issue: is there a problem or not.
3. Then, the commission sent out a (coloured) consultation on the report, which already had a spin on it; assuming that there was a user mobility problem. But, the positive news still was that the Commission claimed to adhere to better regulation:
In line with Better Regulation principles and as a follow-up to the Group's work, the Commission is opening a public consultation on the Group's report. Stakeholders are invited to comment by 1 September 2007. Comments should also address the impact of the Group's recommendations and suggest any other ways to improve customer mobility in relation to bank accounts.
4. To top it of however, without awaiting the results of the consultation, without doing any impact assessment whatsoever, the single market review heads for a specific direction (asking the industry to do national things on switching services) that should normally be the result of the analysis in the impact assessment.
5. Given that the results of this expert group do not at all come in handy (as it acknowledges the need for a solid evidence base), the work of the expert group is completely left unmentioned.
6. So now the Commission moves ahead, will undoubtedly publish a press release to take things a further step forward ('inviting the industry to come up with national solutions to switching') without due consideration to the real facts and developments in the market.

Interestingly: if the analysis is that switching is not a pan European issue, it's not up to the Commission to act. Similarly, if there is no impact assessment, it's not up to the Commission to do anything else than make one. But then again, the Commission seems to think: a scare tactic always seems to work with banks, so let's see if we can move them in a direction by threatening, even if we put aside our own principles and follow gut-feeling rather than facts and due process.

Unfortunately this fits nicely into an earlier grim picture that I sketched on the true better regulation approach of the Commission. Which essentially was that it is about lipservice more than true service to the citizens of the Community.

Single Market Review.... where are the real barriers to Europe....?

In the next months, the European Commission will publish its Single Market Review. It will be a stock taking high-level assessment and announcement of plans, undoubtedly seeking to charm the citizens into Europe by taking easy one-liners and ideas. The FD reports some of the top issues (conveniently leaked by the commission):
- energy prices,
- prices for mobile phoning,
- pricing of bank services.

It is one thing to devote all this attention to price levels and the conception that by regulation those should be harmonised. But it would be another thing to acknowledge the real root cause of insufficient competition in Europe: uneven, nationally inspired implementation of Directives in combination with national supervisors that interpret their competencies in a domestic manner rather than with the European spirit and legislation in mind. This same commission knows this, as they ordered some academics to writethis contribution to the Single Market. Which contains amongst many others the observation:
The adoption and transposition into domestic law of EU Directives is a necessary but insufficient condition for the well-functioning of the Internal Market. Although the SMP and successive Internal Market strategies have been aimed at creating a level playing field by providing a set of rules to be applied across the Community territory, some provisions have lacked clarity and precision. The result is divergent, occasionally even conflicting interpretations by different Member States, which often result in the distortion of competition. Problems resulting from an uneven application and weak enforcement of EU regulation have been highlighted by many respondents of a recent public consultation carried out by the Commission on the future Single Market policy.

Suppose you have a house with a number of rooms and one central heating system and knobs on the individual radiators in the room. And you note that the temperature in the rooms is different, whereas you would prefer it to be equal in all rooms. Would it be smarter to adopt another extra regulation to align these temperatures, or would it be more intelligent to order the government officials in the individual rooms to back off from the radiator knobs and let the central heating do its work?

I hope the Single Market Review comes up with a structural suggestion other than the 'better regulation' mantra, to solve that problem. Because national sentiments and rules and interpretations of domestic regulators are at the heart of the non-existence of a real Single Market.

News on being overdraft in the Netherlands

the AD had some news on the overdraft behaviour of the Dutch. One third of the public is never in the red on its account. One third only sometimes. 17 % often and 11% always. The amount of money involved is about 8 billion euro; it's unlikely that (as the article stated) this full 8 billion wouldbe unagreed overdraft. It's more likely that a huge amount of that money is agreed lending via the payment account. But figures in this respect are scarce.

Dutch SEPA website online

This week De Pers points to the Dutch SEPA.NL website, informing the public about SEPA. The site has got a bunch of material and backgrond information. Mostly in Dutch, but there's also a English page with info on the migration to SEPA in the Netherlands.

Fortis shareholders agree to share emission and ABN AMRO takeover

BNR Nieuwsradio reports that today the Fortis shareholders agreed to a share emission and to the ABN AMRO take-over. So ABN AMRO then published a statement that as of tomorrow there will be two competing bids on the table. One from Barclays and the other from the consortium with Banco Santander, Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis.

And ABN AMRO also announced that it intends to hold an informative Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders on 20 September 2007 at 10:30 in 'de Doelen' in Rotterdam to discuss the offer by Barclays and by the Consortium of RBS, Santander and Fortis. The agenda items for that meeting will include a background to the public offers on all outstanding shares of ABN AMRO by Barclays and the Consortium, and the reasoned opinions of the Managing Board and Supervisory Board on those offers and the alternatives considered.

Quite an interesting meeting that will be.....

PS. Meanwhile today, the European Commission also cleared the merger between Barclays and ABN AMRO. So would the consortium get them to clear their initiative as well?

Currence: Dutch debit card phased out gradually / ECB re-engineers policy history

The Financieele Dagblad reported on a presentation session that occured yesterday as a part of the presentation of the annual report of Currence: scheme owner of Dutch collective payment products PIN (POS-payment), Chipknip (e-purse), direct debit and acceptgiro (bill-payment). Main news is that Currence announces that it seeks to maintain the brand PIN until the future market situation (in particular fees) is clear.

Essentially this is no news, as banks had already outlined that they would not phase out PIN without looking at market developments and consulting retailers. but still this may provide some comfort to Dutch retailers. Interestingly ECB-policy department chief Ruttenberg stated that he noticed a change in banks' behaviour: while they were first eager to phase out the pin-product, they would now seem to think otherwise. He noted a change in attitude there.

Ruttenbergs' statement can be best viewed as a projection in psychological terms. He notcies a change with the banks, which tells us something about what happens to the ECB. Because the real change in attitude is not with banks but with the ECB. In 2004 the ECB had no clue as to the market reality for cards payments. This speech of Tumpell Gugerell essentially discussed anti-fraud measures and standardisation. Then came the rush to implement SEPA. Both ECB and Commission urged the banks to quickly move towards panEuropean products and phase out domestic products by the end of 2010 (see the speech here). At this time the banks strongly complained about this deadline setting by ECB and outlined the business (interchange fees etc) and customer issues (need for a gradual migration rather than big bangs) involved. So the ECB slowly understood that indeed there was something as interchange issues that could stand in the way.

Then, somewhere in 2005 or 2006, having banged the panEuropean quick migration drum for some years now, the ECB changed its mind and did no longer demand changeover to international schemes. Rather it pursued the idea of a third Euro-scheme to compete with the other schemes (needless to say that VISA already transformed their business in Europe into a European scheme; a fact that has apparently went by unnoticed in Frankfurt). So the analysis from the Frankfurt towers is now that there might be a business case for such a card scheme and that banks should not rush into migration towards US dominated international schemes take over.

It is quite interesting to note that a mere change of responsibilities and roles within the ECB also leads to a re-interpretation of reality by the ECB-policy makers. They now re-engineer the policy history as if banks wanted to go quick and they as ECB need to slow them banks down and point out a different policy option (setting up a third scheme) which some years before, was absolutely not the desired goal of the ECB.

Updated June 8: see also the speeches by the ESCB and Commission.

P&S news 50 is out...

With:
1. ECB and European Commission – Joint statement on the adoption of the Payment Services Directive
2. PayPal Europe – granted banking licence by the CSSF in Luxembourg
3. United Kingdom – Google checkout launched in the UK
4. Sweden – New structure for cash handling
5. Visa payWave – contactless payment solutions get a global brand name

Articles, speeches and reports:
1. European Commission – SEPA conference for public administrations
2. ECB – "The new SEPA landscape from vision to reality (and back)", speech by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell
3. ECB – “Modernising payments: No pain no gain”, speech by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell
4. Banca d'Italia – Guidelines for the business continuity of payment system significant infrastructures
5. Bank of England – Financial Stability Paper No. 2 – A new approach to assessing risks to financial stability
6. Magyar Nemzeti Bank – April 2007 Report on Financial Stability
7. Sveriges Riksbank – The use of cash and the size of the shadow economy in Sweden
8. Bank of Canada – Modelling Payments Systems: A Review of the Literature
9. Bank of Canada – Managing Adverse Dependence for Portfolios of Collateral in Financial Infrastructures
10. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City – Interchange Fees in Australia, the UK and the United States: Matching Theory and Practice
11. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – Study of Consumer Behavior and Payment Choice: A survey of Federal Reserve System Employees
12. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – Update of the Consumer Payments Research Industry Reference Guide
13. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – Emerging payments industry briefing: "Mobile phone: the new way to pay?"
14. CapGemini - World Retail Banking Report 2007
15. UEAPME – The European association of craft, small and medium-sized enterprises has published a position paper on the SEPA
16. ForeSee – Bank customer satisfaction higher through online bill payment.